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Currently, little is known about how synesthesia develops and which aspects of
synesthesia can be acquired through a learning process. We review the increasing
evidence for the role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia, and
argue for the thesis that synesthetic abilities are developed and modified by semantic
mechanisms. That is, in certain people semantic mechanisms associate concepts with
perception-like experiences—and this association occurs in an extraordinary way. This
phenomenon can be referred to as “higher” synesthesia or ideasthesia. The present
analysis suggests that synesthesia develops during childhood and is being enriched further
throughout the synesthetes’ lifetime; for example, the already existing concurrents may be
adopted by novel inducers or new concurrents may be formed. For a deeper understanding
of the origin and nature of synesthesia we propose to focus future research on two
aspects: (i) the similarities between synesthesia and ordinary phenomenal experiences
based on concepts; and (ii) the tight entanglement of perception, cognition and the
conceptualization of the world. Importantly, an explanation of how biological systems get
to generate experiences, synesthetic or not, may have to involve an explanation of how
semantic networks are formed in general and what their role is in the ability to be aware
of the surrounding world.
Keywords: synesthesia, perception, cognition, concepts, learning, semantics, cognitive penetrability
INTRODUCTION
Following a long history of interdisciplinary research on synes-
thesia (see e.g., Locke, 1689; Galton, 1883/1907/1973; Mahling,
1926; Peacock, 1988; Cytowic, 1995, 2002; van Campen, 1999;
Day, 2005; Dixon and Smilek, 2005; Jewanski and Sidler, 2006;
Macpherson, 2007; Brogaard, 2013; Auvray and Deroy, 2014),
at the beginning of the 21st century an important debate has
emerged about the fundamental nature of synesthesia. Initially,
the discussion was dominated by the explanation of synesthesia in
terms of intermixed senses. It was presumed that a sensory input
in one modality directly elicits an additional sensory activation
in another sensory modality, and this was further deduced to
be based on direct connections between the respective brain
areas, known also as the cross-activation hypothesis (e.g., Baron-
Cohen and Harrison, 1997; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a;
Cytowic, 2002).
However, meanwhile, this interpretation has encountered
problems. It has become apparent that in many forms of synes-
thetic associations, only the concurrents exhibit clear sensory-
like properties, while the inducers take the form of concepts.
For example, one of the most common forms of synesthesia is
time-unit synesthesia (Smilek et al., 2007a; Jarick et al., 2008,
2009, 2011; Brang et al., 2013b) in which weekdays or months
are associated with colors, distinct spatial positions and with
other concurrents. Importantly, there are no direct sensory inputs
for time units. One cannot directly see June or Thursday in a
way one can see a car or letter “A”. Time units exclusively exist
as concepts. But time-unit synesthesia is not the only case. For
other forms of synesthesia the traditional, sensory-to-sensory
characterization has also been found unsatisfactory (Ward and
Simner, 2003; Ward, 2004; Simner, 2007; Nikolic´ et al., 2011;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012). Thus, it has been repeat-
edly suggested that a full account of the phenomenon should go
beyond the standard sensory-sensory approach (e.g., Dixon et al.,
2000, 2006; Simner and Ward, 2006; Ward et al., 2006; Ward
and Sagiv, 2007; Sagiv et al., 2011; Eagleman, 2012; Jürgens and
Nikolic´, 2012, 2014; Simner, 2012; Watson et al., 2012a, 2014;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013; Chiou and Rich, 2014;
Brogaard, 2014; Brogaard et al., 2014).
A number of different remedies to the problem of an adequate
characterization of synesthesia have been proposed. An attempt
to bridge this discrepancy between the theory and the data was
to postulate individual differences among synesthetes (Dixon
and Smilek, 2005; Hubbard et al., 2005; Cytowic and Eagleman,
2009; Rouw and Scholte, 2010; Rouw, 2011; Simner, 2013). Thus,
there would be two main groups, higher and lower synesthetes,
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depending on whether their synesthesia is triggered by the con-
ceptual or by the sensory properties of a stimulus, respectively
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b). Another approach was to
suggest that the phenomenon oscillates between these two types
of inducers within one and the same individual (Hubbard et al.,
2005; Ward et al., 2007).
It can be said that the last decade experienced a renewed
interest in re-conceptualizing and re-defining the phenomenon
of synesthesia (Simner, 2007, 2012; Sagiv et al., 2011; Cohen
Kadosh and Terhune, 2012; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014). Researchers have started to
question the exclusively sensory interpretation of synesthesia and
have suggested that the phenomenon also involved high-level cog-
nitive representations (Ward et al., 2006, 2007; Ward and Sagiv,
2007). This includes the proposal that synesthesia is exclusively
a semantically induced phenomenon (Nikolic´, 2009; Chiou and
Rich, 2014). This suggestion severs the traditional distinction
between perception and cognition assumed for a long time in phi-
losophy, psychology and cognitive science (Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz
and Werning, 2012; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013). Evidence for this
alternative, extended view of synesthesia is continually increasing
(Dixon et al., 2000, 2006; Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001;
Elias et al., 2003; Mroczko et al., 2009; Nikolic´ et al., 2011;
Simner, 2012; Rothen et al., 2013; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014).
The aim of the present paper is to examine these fundamen-
tal issues and the particular forms of the phenomenon for
which the hypothesis applies that semantic mechanisms create
synesthesia.
MIND-DRIVEN HIGHER SYNESTHESIA
In synesthesia, an attended and recognized stimulus leads to addi-
tional phenomenal experiences, that is, to experiential states that
normally do not occur (Rich and Mattingley, 2003; Mattingley,
2009; Nijboer and Van der Stigchel, 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz
and Nikolic´, 2013). As a result, the stimuli corresponding to
the inducer and the experiences associated with the concur-
rent form a highly integrated percept—a phenomenally unified
experience (Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012; Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz, 2013). This unified experience may cover the same
sensory modality, or different sensory modalities, or even dif-
ferent domains e.g., cognitive, sensory and motor. The resulting
conscious experiences are typically unified, meaning that all the
experiences at a given time are present simultaneously form-
ing an overall phenomenal perspective—a single encompassing
phenomenal state. The different component experiences are said
to be co-conscious parts or aspects of the subsuming state that
has a conjoint phenomenology, or a joint phenomenal content
(Shoemaker, 1996, 2003; Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Tye, 2003;
Brook and Raymont, 2013). As such, they are intimately linked
and integrated from the perspective of the self. Consequently,
a person’s perceptual and cognitive states result in a synchronic
phenomenal unity (Raymont and Brook, 2009; Bayne, 2010;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013).
One of the most important issues in the current debate about
the phenomenon of synesthesia pertains to the putative causal
mechanisms underlying synesthetic associations. The question of
whether synesthesia is a lower or higher phenomenon translates
into a question of whether novel synesthetic associations can
be explained by direct synaptic connections between neurons
representing respectively the inducer and the concurrent—which
is a possible explanation of the low-level hypothesis. Alternatively,
synesthetic associations may occur through a high-level of system
organization, that enables associations to be formed in a more
elaborated, distributed and flexible manner than what can be
accounted for by direct synaptic connections between sensory
areas. The latter would correspond to the high-level hypothesis of
synesthesia and is closer to the level at which the semantic struc-
ture of knowledge operates: rich association systems involving
additional brain areas as opposed to direct connections between
two sensory areas of the brain (for a recent hypothesis on the
involvement of ventral IT-cortex see Chiou and Rich, 2014). At
this higher level a prominent role is played by context, attentional
mechanisms, and interpretation of the stimuli.
The two levels are often referred to as perceptual and conceptual
(or cognitive), respectively (Ward and Simner, 2003; Eagleman,
2012; Simner, 2012; see also Evans, 1982). This is because it
is typically assumed that perception is an earlier and hence,
more rudimentary stage of information processing than is the
activation and processing of semantic information. Nevertheless,
the distinction between higher and lower synesthetes responding
to respectively, high- and low-level features of inducing stimulus
has rarely been a topic of direct investigation.
Many forms of synesthesia indicate the involvement of seman-
tic processes i.e., of the meaning of the stimulus. Synesthetes often
associate the same concurrent (e.g., the same hue of a color)
with different physical representations of the stimulus, i.e., with
different sensory instantiations of the same concept (e.g., the
Arabic digit “4”, the Roman numeral “IV”, the word “four”, and
four dots on a dice; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Ward
et al., 2007). Number-color synesthesia can be induced via sensory
presentation (e.g., digits), but also conceptually via cardinality
(the quantity) or via another conceptual property of ordinality
(the position in a sequence).
There are two other common forms of synesthesia that can be
mind-driven and that are variants of the already mentioned time-
unit synesthesia: the first is known as colored sequence synesthesia
in which names of time units, such as days of the week and
months of the year, are colored differently from their graphemic
constituents (Simner et al., 2006; Tomson et al., 2013), and the
second is known as spatial sequence synesthesia in which ordinal
categories involving numbers, time and alphabet elicit experience
of spatial forms (Sagiv et al., 2006; Eagleman, 2009).
A related phenomenon observed in non-synesthetes, which
suggests a bridge between synesthesia and non-synesthetic per-
ception, is the spatial numerical association of response codes.
Here, overlearned ordinal stimuli are associated with implicit
spatial representations (Dehaene et al., 1993).
Some neuroanatomical studies have suggested that differ-
ences between higher and lower synesthetes map onto another,
more empirically grounded, distinction between associators and
projectors (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a,b; Dixon et al.,
2004; Dixon and Smilek, 2005; Hubbard et al., 2005; Rouw and
Scholte, 2010; van Leeuwen et al., 2011). The assumption is
that a semantic representation of number (relevant for higher
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synesthetes) is likely linked to a more conceptual representa-
tion of color (relevant for associators experiencing their colors
internally in their “mind’s eye”). However, recent evidence seems
to challenge this view suggesting that the two distinctions are
not the same but rather orthogonal (Ward et al., 2007). Ward
and colleagues propose that the mechanisms that give rise to
the associator-projector distinction are independent of those
that give rise to higher-lower characteristics. According to the
researchers, the former reflects an internal vs. external frame
of spatial reference related to synesthetic phenomenology, and
the latter reflects the extent to which conceptual vs. sensory
properties of the stimulus are involved in the induction of synes-
thesia. Along with the results of the behavioral tests and subjects’
phenomenological reports, they found that higher synesthetes
were not necessarily grapheme-color associators, but could also
be projectors.
As an explanation of the finding Ward et al. (2007) pro-
posed to differentiate between surface-projectors and near space-
projectors. Surface projectors evoke an externalized frame of
reference relative to the location of the stimulus, perceiving their
synesthetic color concurrents as located in the same spatial loca-
tion as the inducing graphemes, dice patterns, finger counting,
etc. In contrast, near space-projectors elicit an externalized frame
of reference relative to the location of their body. For example,
the concurrent may always be located 20 cm in front of the
perceiver. This dissociation may help explain varying results for
projectors. Projectors are shown to be faster in naming their
synesthetic colors than veridical colors, and associators exhibit the
opposite effect (Smilek et al., 2001, 2003). However, projectors
who project colors into external space but not onto the surface
of graphemes may behave more like associators on the task of
naming their concurrents. Near space-projectors may be slower
with synesthetic colors than with ink colors as a result of the need
to shift their attention from the grapheme location to the color
location. In contrast, surface-projectors place concurrents at the
same location as the attended stimuli, which may then enable
more efficient naming of synesthetic colors.
The Ward et al. (2007) study also suggests that it may well
be possible for a synesthete to demonstrate higher synesthesia
in one respect but lower in another, e.g., experiencing number
forms may be shared by two groups, associators and projectors.
The respective internal and external location of spatial forms does
not have to reflect the spatial reference of their experiences when,
for example, reading graphemes. One and the same synesthete
may be an associator in his number forms but a projector for
his grapheme-colors. In line with this, a comparable oscillation
between high and low synesthesia may occur within the same
person for the different forms of synesthetic associations the
person possesses.
This view is supported by studies on numerical cognition
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006a,b)
in which digit-color projectors showed a characteristic feature of
higher synesthesia when linking colors with the meaning of num-
bers or with information on magnitude. Similarly, both projectors
and associators showed Stroop-like effects when perceiving color
for an arithmetic sum in which the result was implied and
not visually presented and hence, had to be extracted through
semantic mechanisms (Dixon et al., 2000; Jansari et al., 2006). For
lower synesthetes, color would have to be linked to the visually
presented physical form of the digit, and not to the conceptual
aspects of a number. Hence, it is possible that for different
individuals the semantic structures that lead to synesthesia are
organized differently. Some synesthetes may be higher in the
sense of visuo-spatial properties such as the number forms and
ordinality (and spatial forms for time and the alphabet since these
concepts also possess ordinality), while other synesthetes may be
higher in the sense of numerosity (cardinal aspects of number
meaning, number concepts). And yet, there could be a group that
combines the two effects, which then results in having the same
color for “January” and “1”, “February” and “2”, etc. (Sagiv et al.,
2006).
Examples of cases of synesthetic experiences arising in the
absence of any direct impact or physical presence of the stimulus,
or occurring independently of the various physical forms that
external inducers may take, are mind-dependent or mind-driven
higher synesthesia, also known as ideasthesia. We suggest that
these experiences are driven by semantic mechanisms as a part
of mental representations whereby each synesthete’s individual
semantic network contains concurrents as a part of the meaning
of the inducing stimuli (Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014). A similar
proposal for a conceptual contribution to synesthesia was made
by Meier (2013). Meier’s approach is based on the research on
implicit bidirectionality (Brugger et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2007;
Weiss et al., 2009), and states that processing of an inducer is
affected by a spreading of implicit activation of a concurrent.
This is in agreement with our claim that synesthetic associations
include unconventionally coupled supplementary phenomenal
features as a part of the semantic knowledge network. Therefore,
synesthetic experiences do not have to rely on external stim-
uli to be induced, i.e., cognitive or concept-dependent mental
states are reported to be sufficient to elicit synesthetic percep-
tual concurrents in the absence of any related physical stimu-
lation (Nikolic´ et al., 2011; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012).
The above-mentioned case of a digit-color synesthete stud-
ied by Dixon et al. (2000) using mental arithmetic, provided
a striking example of conceptual synesthesia. Not only viewing
digits triggered a visual experience of a specific color. Also a
mental activation of the concept of the calculated number was
fully sufficient to evoke synesthesia (e.g., even without writing
down the result of the calculation) (Figure 1). This was revealed
when the synesthete performed mathematical additions such as
“4 + 3” followed by a patch colored congruently or incongruently
to the synesthetic color associated with the result of the sum-
mation (e.g., yellow for digit 7). The result of summation was
never directly presented. The synesthete had to name the color
FIGURE 1 | An example of the stimuli used in the experiment of Dixon
et al., 2000).
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of the patch before reporting the result of the summation. The
responses were slower in the case of incongruency i.e., when the
color of the patch was different from the color associated with
the arithmetical sum. This Stroop-like test objectified the mind-
driven case of synesthesia demonstrating that the cause of this
synesthetic experience is not provided by the immediate sensory
stimulation.
Another source of evidence of mind-dependent synesthesia
has been provided in studies with letter-color synesthetes report-
ing to experience the same concurrent to different physical stimuli
representing the same type, kind or semantic category. Experi-
ences were the same for letters presented in different alphabets
(Mroczko et al., 2009), various fonts, or presented via different
sensory modalities—visual or auditory (Simner, 2007). Similarly,
number-color synesthetes show indifference to a wide range of
physical instantiations of numerosity (Dixon et al., 2000; Ward
and Sagiv, 2007).
Such sets of low-level sensory features or objects identified
as members of a familiar meaningful category are the subject of
recent philosophical discussions about object recognition and the
related high-level vs. low-level content of perception referring to
a kind property (i.e., when recognizing that something belongs to
a certain kind or type, like being a tiger, being a pine tree, etc.)
(Pylyshyn, 1999; Siegel, 2006; Bayne, 2009). The same analysis
might apply to typical synesthetic inducers such as seeing letters
“A”, “A” and “a” all as “A”, that is, recognizing an exemplar of
a certain semantic category (i.e., a token of a type). There is
no consensus on how to interpret such content, as high-level
conceptual or low-level perceptual, but an agreement is that this
content is cognitive, at least in some general sense.
A related issue is that of the mode of recognition that applies
to such a kind property (Simner, 2007; Auvray and Deroy, 2014;
see Pylyshyn, 1999 for the argument that a computation based on
perceptual principles inherent to categorical perception may lead
to low-level detection of similarities between stimuli). We propose
that at least for some forms of developmental synesthesia, if not
for all, the concurrent is activated only after semantic decoding of
the inducer is completed—i.e., the meaning of inducer must be
extracted before concurrent can be experienced. As mentioned,
a number of studies provide convincing evidence for the role of
conceptual contents in the induction of synesthesia (see Figure 2
for an illustration of that proposal).
Thus, the studies confirm that synesthetic experiences are
largely internally-driven by mental representations of objects,
higher-order types and semantic categories, cognitive states
and events, or other internal determinants such as concepts,
thoughts, moods, memories and imagery (Spiller and Jansari,
2008; Rothen et al., 2012; Meier and Rothen, 2013; Simner,
2013; Ward et al., 2013). Another form of higher synes-
thesia has been observed in two different individuals who
acquired their color/shape synesthesia for digits and mathemat-
ical formulas; interestingly the visual concurrents were gener-
ated in higher parietal and frontal brain regions (Bor et al.,
2007; Brogaard et al., 2013). Since the cognitive representa-
tions seem to be factors sufficient to elicit synesthesia they
may also play a role in explaining variations of synesthetic
experiences.
In the following section, we make the point that concep-
tual properties are shared across many forms of synesthe-
sia. This makes us consider higher (semantic) synesthesia a
separate class, which ought to have its own place in the synes-
thetic taxonomy and has to be considered accordingly in the
definitional and explanatory efforts of investigations into the
phenomenon.
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS AND SEMANTIC MECHANISMS
INVOLVED IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF SYNESTHESIA
To substantiate the importance of studying higher synesthesia,
we highlight numerous conceptual aspects and semantic mech-
anisms involved in various types of synesthesia. An account
directly addressing the influence of semantic information on the
induction of synesthetic experience is “ideasthesia” which literally
means sensing concepts, and refers to the conceptual processing
underlying synesthesia in which only concurrents are perceptual
while inducers are conceptual (Nikolic´, 2009). According to this
model, high-level semantic mechanisms assign low-level sensory
concurrents (e.g., synesthetic colors are triggered only when a
synesthete extracts the meaning of the presented grapheme; see
also Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012, 2014; Milán et al., 2013; cf. Brang
et al., 2013a).
Synesthetic associations are not just cross-modal, but they also
cross domains, i.e., besides the various modalities of senses, these
associations may involve domains of bodily, motor and emotional
states as well as domains of abstract, conceptually-represented
entities like numbers or time units. Cases of synesthetic inducers
going beyond traditionally denoted sensory modalities have been
found for activities such as reading musical notes, calculating,
imagining, or just thinking of a stimulus (Frith and Paulesu, 1997;
Grossenbacher, 1997; Dixon et al., 2000, 2006; Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b; Cytowic, 2002; Rich et al., 2005; Ward et al.,
2006; Spiller and Jansari, 2008; Nikolic´ et al., 2011).
Studies with bilingual grapheme-color synesthetes have shown
that synesthetesia can be experienced also for alphabets different
from the one used in the first language (Mills et al., 2002; Rich
et al., 2005; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006). In such a cross-
linguistic transfer synesthetic colors from a second language
are usually mapped onto the existing colors of the first lan-
guage (Simner, 2007; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013).
Often, the color is associated with a letter by its similarity to
other letters, i.e., letters of similar shapes tend to elicit sim-
ilar colors (Brang et al., 2011a; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012,
2014).
Results from our own studies suggest that synesthetic asso-
ciations to new graphemes are established quickly, and are not
created from scratch but are inherited from existing associations,
the concurrent colors being passively adopted from the origi-
nal synesthesia (Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and
Nikolic´, 2013). To demonstrate this, we conducted a study with
16 grapheme-color synesthetes in which we attempted to replicate
in the laboratory conditions the natural phenomenon of cross-
linguistic transfer. We introduced Glagolitic graphemes (novel
shapes, without any corresponding sound), which come from an
ancient Eastern European writing system that was ideal for our
study; it had the sufficient exotic appearance. Only few letters
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the view that conceptual contents might be the inducers of idiosyncratic synesthetic experiences.
FIGURE 3 | (A) The correspondence between the graphemes of Latin and
square Glagolitic alphabets. (B) Illustration of the color experience
associated with a new grapheme after a short training. Both figures
republished with permission of ARVO, from Immediate transfer of
synesthesia to a novel inducer. Mroczko et al. (2009); permission conveyed
through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.
bore any physical resemblance to other known graphemes (see
Figure 3; Franolic´ and Žagar, 2008).
We assigned to each new grapheme a meaning by linking it to
existing Latin letters and Arabic numerals. A simple writing exer-
cise with paper and pencil sufficed to imitate the natural cross-
linguistic transfer. The exercise lasted less than 10 min during
which subjects learned how to write a Glagolitic grapheme and
then used this knowledge to write 20 words or number sequences.
The subjects substituted one familiar Latin/Arabic grapheme with
its Glagolitic counterpart (as in Figure 3B). This resulted in a
quick transfer of the original synesthetic color experiences from
their native Latin alphabet to Glagolitic graphemes never seen
before the experiment (Mroczko et al., 2009). Also, Stroop-type
tests (Stroop, 1935; Mills et al., 1999; Nikolic´ et al., 2007) indi-
cated that these new synesthetic associations were immediate and
involuntary.
The novel synesthetic associations were created within
minutes, which was too rapid a process to be accounted for by
low-level sensory cross-wiring between grapheme and color brain
areas. Low-level perceptual learning is usually not cognitively
penetrable (see below) and, as a result, it is a relatively slow
process requiring typically thousands of trials (Ahissar and
Hochstein, 1997; Goldstone, 1998; Seitz and Watanabe, 2005).
In contrast, the meaning of a new symbol can be learned quickly
(often in a single trial; Markson and Bloom, 1997; Bloom,
2000). Thus, shorter transfer times of synesthetic associations
are expected if the associations originate at the semantic level of
representation. In other words, the speed of transfer is indicative
of the type of representation (high- vs. low-level).
Additionally, the new associations generalized to the exem-
plars of different physical representation (handwritten by another
person), which is consistent with learning a semantic category
of stimuli rather than individual exemplars, or particular motor
coordinates, and is also inconsistent with perceptual learning. The
ways in which these stimuli were similar can be described only as
semantic “similarities”, i.e., they shared the same meaning and not
elementary visual features presumably processed in the grapheme
area (Brang et al., 2011a).
Therefore, a better explanation of grapheme-color synesthesia
can be provided by high-level conceptual mechanisms than by
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low-level associations: arbitrary synesthetic colors can be assigned
to novel graphemes through transfer of semantic knowledge.
This suggests the involvement of the high-level stimulus proper-
ties in eliciting synesthetic colors. The newly created synesthetic
associations to Glagolitic letters must have been induced via
existing synesthetic associations previously linked to conceptual
representations of the Latin letters. In other words, after training,
a Glagolitic letter would activate the same semantic content that
is normally activated by a Latin letter. Here, as for the other
cases of higher synesthesia, the meaning of the stimulus has to
be extracted before the concurrent phenomenal aspect can be
included into an overall unified synesthetic experience (Edquist
et al., 2006; Simner, 2007; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013). Therefore,
synesthesia seems to rely essentially on a certain conceptual rep-
resentation of the stimulus.
The significance of meaning and context in grapheme-color
synesthesia was demonstrated also in the study “Is the sky 2?”,
using electroencephalography to measure event-related potentials
(Brang et al., 2008). The authors concluded that connections
between colors and numbers are bidirectional and that concurrent
color sensations are treated by synesthetes as meaningful stimuli.
The impact of semantic activation and linguistic modulation such
as numerical magnitude or the frequency of grapheme use in a
language may also be reflected in the saturation and luminance
of the experienced colors (Beeli et al., 2007; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2007; Smilek et al., 2007b; Watson et al., 2012b; see also work by
Akins et al. on different languages’ effects upon grapheme-color
synesthesia). Moreover, synesthetic colors elicited by ambiguous
graphemes are modified by context. They depend on the inter-
pretation of the grapheme either as a letter or as a digit (e.g.,
the grapheme “V” referring to Latin letter and Roman numeral;
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Dixon et al., 2006).
Another example providing support for the view that semantic
mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia, is
number-color synesthesia. Here, it is the higher cognitive numer-
ical representation, the conceptual representation of a number
(numerosity, quantity), that is responsible for eliciting synesthetic
concurrent experiences (Butterworth, 1999; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2005; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006a,b). In such a case, same
colors are elicited from physically different representations of a
number (e.g., Arabic and Roman numerals, arrays of dots, dice
patterns, finger counting or number names), provided they match
in the indicated quantity (Dixon et al., 2006; Ward and Sagiv,
2007; Ward et al., 2007).
In case of projectors, colors may be projected not only on
the surface of a page when viewing written digits, but also on
the surface of a dice or on synesthete’s fingers when counting.
The color reported for all these different physical instantiations
of number concept is the same. The cardinality is the direct
cause of the sameness of color across various notational formats
(Ward and Sagiv, 2007). During development, the synesthetic
cardinality-color associations may become generalized to other
education-based and culturally acquired symbols. Other forms of
synesthesia, described above, confirm that color concurrents may
transfer from one physical system of representation to another on
the basis of semantic correspondences, due to shared conceptual
properties (Mroczko et al., 2009; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012).
For some synesthetes the colors of the writing system from a
second language are taken from the colors of the alphabet of their
first language (Mills et al., 2002; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006;
Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013), or
the synesthetic color experience associated with a written musical
note acquires the color of the name denoting it (Ward et al.,
2006).
Other examples might be number-forms synesthesia, time-
units or calendar synesthesia, all of which involve experiencing
numbers or time-units within a space. Thinking about sequential
concepts, such as numerical sequences in a form of days of
the week or months, elicits spatial forms and visualized mental
maps that contain arranged numbers (Sagiv et al., 2006). For
example, a subject may experience units of time as being arranged
in an ellipse, column or a spiral. Moreover, this spatial struc-
ture is usually placed at a specific spatial location within the
three-dimensional space surrounding the body of the synesthete.
Alternatively, the structure is located within a virtual space not
positioned relative to the body but within the mind’s eye (e.g.,
Smilek et al., 2007a; Jarick et al., 2008; Mann et al., 2009; Simner
et al., 2009).
Days of the week as well as months present maybe the most
apparent form of a conceptual inducer, as they do not possess any
characteristic sensory properties. There is nothing perceptually
specific that distinguishes a Monday from a Wednesday or May
from August.
Another illustrative example of how concepts have impact on
synesthetic experiences is given by lexical-gustatory synesthesia.
In this case, different flavors are experienced in response to vari-
ous words. Interestingly, such synesthetes can perceive a gustatory
sensation even before articulating a given word thus, while the
word is still on the tip of their tongue i.e., in the semantic phase
(Simner and Ward, 2006). This demonstrates that the physical
instantiation of the stimulus (i.e., the somato-sensory experience
of verbalization, the spoken expression of a thought in words)
is not necessary for eliciting synesthetic sensations of a flavor.
The activation of the concept, which is grasped mentally, is fully
sufficient.
Higher cognitive aspects of inducing synesthesia can further-
more be identified in mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia.
When seeing another person being touched or being in pain,
any person may trigger corresponding emotions and empathy. In
synesthetes however, in addition, a respective tactile or painful
experience may be produced. And this experience has the quality
of real touch and pain, even being located on the equivalent part
of synesthete’s body (Blakemore et al., 2005; Banissy and Ward,
2007, 2013; Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).
To the list of synesthesias shown to be based on semantic
interpretation of the stimulus belongs also a recently discovered
swimming-style-to-color-synesthesia in which seeing another
person swimming with a given swimming style, or even just
thinking about a certain swimming style, elicits synesthetic color
experience (Nikolic´ et al., 2011; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012; Rothen et al., 2013) (see Figure 4).
Collectively, all these findings impose constraints on theo-
ries of the neurophysiological origins of synesthesia. Synesthetic
experiences often involve inducers that are not strictly sensory
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Stimuli that can be used in the Stroop-type test:
example pictures of a person performing a butterfly stroke, painted
either in a subject’s synesthetic color (congruent) or in one of his
non-synesthetic colors (incongruent). Reprinted from Swimming-style
synesthesia. Nikolic´ et al. (2011) with permission from Elsevier. (B)
Pictograms of the swimming-styles: (a) butterfly, (b) breaststroke, (c)
backstroke, and (d) crawl used in Rothen et al. (2013). Reprinted
from Psychophysiological evidence for the genuineness of
swimming-style colour synaesthesia. Rothen et al. (2013) with
permission from Elsevier.
(i.e., words, letters, numbers, time units, musical notes, person-
alities, emotions, or movement styles). Conceptual components,
identified in many forms of synesthesia, transcend the tradition-
ally believed sensory nature of inducers. Synesthesia seems to rely
on a certain interpretation of the stimulus and the meaning that
it has for the subject, and this meaning may change dynamically
depending on the context (Rich and Mattingley, 2003; Dixon
et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2006).
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND SYNESTHESIA
These conclusions suggest that some forms of synesthesia may be
understood as cases of cognitive penetrability under the condi-
tions in which the sensory experience normally is not penetrable.
Pylyshyn (1999) introduced the concept of cognitive penetrability
and the lack thereof, to account for the fact that in some cases
visual experience of a perceived object is fully independent of how
we cognitively understand the object or what we know about that
object. For example, in the Mueller-Lyer illusion one of the two
lines continues to appear shorter irrespective of the direction of
attention, our knowledge that the lines are equally long, or of
any other form of mental effort. Thus, in this case the perceptual
experience cannot, in any known way, be affected by cognition.
In other words, the sensory property of visual experience is
cognitively impenetrable. Pylyshyn referred to these impenetrable
aspects of vision as early vision.
Synesthesia may be a case in which cognitive penetration
also takes place for early sensory processing. For example, the
perception of colors is usually considered impenetrable, i.e.,
cognitive operations cannot change the experience of the color
of a perceived object (Brogaard and Gatzia, in press; but cf.
Macpherson, 2012; Siegel, 2012; Vetter and Newen, 2014). At
least this seems to be the case for non-synesthetes. Synesthetes
are special in that they are able to penetrate this early aspect of
vision (or other sensory modalities) by certain higher cognitive
mechanisms. This means, synesthetic perceptual concurrents can
be modified by conceptual contents, contextual expectations,
linguistic modulation and cultural factors being their inducers
(Dixon et al., 2000; Simner, 2007, 2012; Mroczko et al., 2009;
Meier, 2013; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013; Brogaard
et al., 2014). Activating a concept synesthetes can produce a top-
down influence on a sensory experience. Thus, synesthetes exhibit
a specific difference from non-synesthetes in the structure of their
cognition. The ubiquity of this difference is relatively small, as
it applies to a small subset of the concepts that a given person
possesses and uses throughout the lifetime. For example, it may
apply only to certain graphemes or words. Nevertheless, the very
existence of such penetrability is important for the science of
mental phenomena. It tells us that the organization of the mind is
more flexible than usually presumed.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS
Usually, one expects to assign to any mental event or faculty a
brain region that is being considered its physiological underpin-
ning. For example, if we consider associations between auditory
inducers and visual concurrents, it is expected that there are
distinct brain areas for each and that the physiological account
solely involves those two brain areas. Similarly, if semantic rep-
resentations are included in understanding the functioning of
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synesthesia, one automatically expects that a corresponding third
brain area will be identified and will become a mediator of the
flow of activation, i.e., from auditory, through semantic, to visual
area.
In fact, this traditional one-area-for-function approach has
already been applied to the semantic processes in synesthesia.
Chiou and Rich (2014) propose that the anterior temporal lobe
(ATL) is a hub for inducing synesthesia and that a transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) can lead to a breakdown of the
coupling between inducers and concurrents. If their proposed
research agenda is executed, we will probably soon know whether
this part of the cortex plays a certain role in forming synesthetic
associations.
However, there are reasons to believe that, irrespective of the
results those future studies bring, this may not be the whole story.
Semantics may be something that is not particularly localizable,
but is instead to a high degree a distributed property of the
brain. For example, there is evidence that the motor cortex plays
an important role in the acquisition of action-related concepts
(Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Thus, the role of the motor cortex
may be particularly important when a subject needs to prepare
for a behavioral interaction with the object. Hence, the outcome
of the question of whether semantics can be localized or whether
it is a distributed function also depends on what is meant by
semantics. In a generalized form, a concept may serve an extended
function, not only to give a label to the stimulus, but also to
prepare the person to interact with the conceptualized stimulus.
If this interaction requires manual operations, the corresponding
part of the motor cortex may be as important as the part of the
infero-temporal cortex (Barsalou et al., 2003; Gallese and Lakoff,
2005).
Therefore, to fully account for the physiological underpinnings
of the semantic mechanisms in synesthesia, we propose that
future studies should not focus on a limited, pre-specified set of
brain regions. Instead, a brain-wide analysis should be conducted
with equal emphasis on all of its parts. In the past, such non-
restrictive analyses have been tremendously useful. For example,
the analysis of connectivity in grapheme-color synesthesia (Rouw
and Scholte, 2007) has shown that anatomically much more
changes than connections between grapheme area and color
areas. Anatomical differences associated with synesthesia are wide
spread across the brain. We suggest that these anatomical changes
reflect the widespread nature of semantics in the cortex. That
is, semantics may be a function of the entire cortex, and not a
function of a spatially bound module. In other words, if we accept
the premise that synesthesia is largely a semantic phenomenon,
the findings by Rouw and Scholte reveal the ensuing anatomical
changes of a global network. This global system may be serving
the various semantic aspects of graphemes and may play a role
in its entirety when synesthetic concurrents are being assigned to
those graphemes.
Meanwhile, the evidence has considerably expanded that
synesthesia is not a function of local cortical circuits but a global
phenomenon (Hänggi et al., 2011; Hupé et al., 2012), and so did
the support for the arguments that synesthesia relates to high-level
cognitive functions and abilities, including memory and creativity
(Rothen and Meier, 2010; Rothen et al., 2012; Mulvenna, 2013;
Meier, 2013). One implication is that the research on semantics
in the brain is itself incomplete. Thus, synesthesia research does
not have the luxury of building on well-established physiological
underpinnings of semantics. Rather, synesthesia research has to
coevolve with the research on semantics, helping us understand
better semantics of natural language and cognition—a feat criti-
cally important for cognitive science. Therefore, in future studies,
research on how our brain processes meanings may evolve hand-
to-hand with research on synesthesia.
In this effort, the recently proposed theory of the organization
of adaptive system, named practopoiesis, may provide valuable
guidance (Nikolic´, 2014). According to this theory, semantic
mechanisms are closely related to the mechanisms of general
knowledge stored in long-term memory on the basis of which
more specific knowledge is extracted, which is stored in work-
ing memory. The theory suggests that not only phenomenal
experiences in synesthesia, but also everyday experiences, may
be related to the process of categorization—synesthesia being a
useful trait to enhance this process (see also Jürgens and Nikolic´,
2014). Synesthesia may thus develop in childhood to assist
activation and manipulation of particularly abstract semantic
contents.
These conclusions lead to a very different set of hypothe-
ses that can be formulated about synesthesia than the tradi-
tional hypotheses on brain mechanisms known as cross-activation
hypothesis (i.e., based on neuronal excitation) (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001a; Hubbard et al., 2005) and its alterna-
tive, disinhibition hypothesis (Armel and Ramachandran, 1999;
Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). We discuss those novel pre-
dictions next.
DEVELOPMENT OF SYNESTHESIA
In case that synesthesia is a phenomenon the induction of which
is predominantly semantic, at least for some forms of synesthesia,
the development of synesthetic associations has to be related
to the development of person’s semantic knowledge base. The
process of learning, education and acquiring knowledge about
the surrounding world should in some instances give rise to
synesthetic associations. Insights into how a child’s learning is
associated with synesthesia can be identified from the charac-
teristics of the most common types of synesthesia. A pertinent
question is the following: why are the letters, numbers and the
time-units the most common inducers of synesthesia (Simner
et al., 2006; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). We propose that these
kinds of inducers are frequently the first truly abstract concepts
that a child has to learn, at least in Western civilization.
The following set of hypotheses can be formulated: until a
child begins to learn letters, numbers and days of the week, he or
she is mostly faced with very concrete objects, such as particular
toys, food, items of clothing, etc. These objects have very specific
perceptual representations, which can be memorized and hence,
are relatively easy to manipulate mentally. But then comes the
time when a child must learn abstract concepts. One cannot
see Tuesday or Sunday. There are no basic and straightforward
perceptual memories to be formed for days of the week. Similarly,
numbers (number names) are not just words but they have an
abstract meaning of quantity that can apply to any objects (Teddy
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bears, bananas or shoes). This is one step more abstract than
what the child was used to because none of the perceptually well-
supported images can be used as an identifier of numerosity (there
could be three Teddy bears, three bananas and three shoes but
nothing can explicitly visualize the meaning of number three).
Likewise, one and the same letter can stand for many different
words and thus, for many different objects.
As kids, we all have to find a way to acquire those abstract
concepts. Synesthetes may have an advantage there. They can
assign to those concepts something concrete, perceptual-like, that
will always be present irrespective of the actual objects in the
external world. They can assign a color to the concept, or a spatial
position, or both. That way, they can accelerate their mental
manipulations of those concepts: recall them quicker and more
accurately, determine the relationships between them, and so on.
Synesthesia then becomes a tool for accelerating mental oper-
ations with cognitively demanding i.e., abstract, contents. This
mostly aids the minds that have not yet been elaborated and have
not developed the advanced, adult-like, abstract mechanisms of
thinking. That is, this helps primarily the child’s mind. And this
explains why the most frequent forms of synesthesia involve let-
ters, numbers and time units. Longitudinal studies of synesthesia
starting in early childhood and reaching into the adult years will
likely be of great help as a way to shed light on these processes
(Simner and Bain, 2013; Meier et al., 2014).
DISCUSSION
Generally, perceptual experiences are richer and more fine-
grained than our conceptual apparatus, i.e., they contain more
distinct dimensions and perceptible positions on each dimen-
sion. Non-conceptual contents of perceptual states are more
concrete and specific than are general conceptual contents of
cognitive states (Evans, 1982; Heck, 2000; Peacocke, 2001a,b).
Thus, our ability to discriminate perceptually particular sensory
values exceeds the ability to conceptualize them. For example, we
can notice the difference between specific hues of blue, such as
Blue No. 37 and Blue No. 38, when presented simultaneously.
Nevertheless those hues remain ineffable nuances to most of us
(Raffman, 1995; Metzinger, 2009).
What we learn from studying the semantic aspects of synes-
thesia is that for synesthetes, unlike for non-synesthetes, even
abstract concepts receive some of these fine-grained qualities to
be specifically seen, heard, smelt, tasted, felt, or otherwise expe-
rienced. For example, digits have certain, very distinct, personal-
ities, musical notes are precisely colored, words contain specific
flavors or colors, time units may be positioned at particular
locations in space, and emotions can similarly smell and sound
distinctively (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Grossenbacher, 1997;
Steven and Blakemore, 2004; Simner et al., 2006, 2009; Ward et al.,
2006; Sinha, 2009; Amin et al., 2011; Figure 2).
An analogous ability in the general non-synesthetic population
is discussed in philosophical debates such as that of whether there
are high-level properties in the content of perception (Siegel,
2006; Bayne, 2009). Those who think that there are such prop-
erties in the content of perception hold that high-level prop-
erties enter into phenomenal contents. Another debate pertains
to cognitive phenomenology, according to which phenomenology
extends beyond the sensory domain (Pitt, 2004; Bayne and
Montague, 2011). This means that phenomenal consciousness
cannot be reduced to non-conceptual contents of perceptual
states representing sensory properties. Phenomenal experiences
also involve various cognitive states including high-level con-
ceptual contents. Apparently, not only non-conceptual attributes
determine the character of our phenomenology; conceptual
representations also affect our phenomenal experiences. Thus,
both perceptual and cognitive states are causally and explanatorily
relevant in elucidating how we experience the world because
they both exhibit their own phenomenal characters—something
it is like to be in such a state for the subject (Strawson, 1994;
Chalmers, 1996; Montague and Bayne, 2011; cf. Nagel, 1974),
e.g., both seeing an object of deep red color and understanding
a complicated mathematical formula are associated with certain
phenomenal qualities.
Here we have shown that synesthesia combines a rich diversity
of phenomenal contents—a multitude of experiential levels that
are primarily driven by: sensory, motor, bodily, emotional or
conceptual systems. Consequently, the full combined experience
of synesthesia exhibits a holistic epistemic unity—an overall
integration of experiences driven by different mental faculties,
cognitive and sensory, which are then bound into a coherently
unified conscious experience (Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz, 2013). In this way, synesthesia transgresses the bound-
aries between perception and cognition more than any other
mental phenomenon—i.e., between capacities traditionally con-
sidered as two independently operating domains (Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012).
The cross-domain experiences should not be seen only as an
exception, as if it would only be the case for the extraordinary
phenomenon of synesthesia. Rather, they should be seen as a
general rule applicable also to non-synesthetic practices. If this
premise is accepted, synesthesia may be understood as making use
of mechanisms similar to those present in ordinary perception
and imagery (Ward et al., 2007). The reason why a synesthete
takes an extra step in creating a unique synesthetic experience
may lie in the nature of the individual semantic network of
concepts s/he is deploying. As Jürgens and Nikolic´ (2014)
proposed, the semantic structure of each inducing category (e.g.,
a letter of an alphabet) may be richer for a synesthete by one
attribute than for a non-synesthete. Thus, besides the size, shape,
or position in the alphabet, or an associated sound, a synesthete
would have one more attribute for each grapheme—its color.
In general, we propose that perception and conceptual knowl-
edge are intimately linked and should be investigated together as
a unified research problem. By doing so, more progress may be
made in understanding human cognition—both synesthetic and
non-synesthetic. Thus, lessons learned from synesthesia may be
extended into the “ordinary world” of perception and help us
develop an integrative approach. This approach would recognize
that the boundary between cognition and perception is elusive:
perception is more sophisticated than traditionally assumed, ris-
ing up to the “high-level”. And similarly, “low-level” cognitive
operations are fundamentally grounded in our perceptual capa-
bilities (Schyns et al., 1998; Goldstone et al., 2010; Goldstone and
Hendrickson, 2010).
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Much evidence exists that perception affects cognition such
as belief acquisition and formation of concepts (Prinz and
Barsalou, 2000; Goldstone et al., 2008; Barsalou, 2009, 2012).
This supports the hypothesis of concept empiricism, according
to which conceptual representations and abstract conceptual
knowledge are perceptually based. The underlying operations
involve re-activation of perceptual and motor representations
(Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998; Barsalou, 1999; Prinz, 2002,
2005). Conceptual contents affect not only the phenomenal
character of cognitive states (Montague and Bayne, 2011),
but they can equally so inform and influence the phenomenal
character of perceptual states; in other words they can cognitively
penetrate our perception (Macpherson, 2012). For example,
changes in the conceptual content of the inducing stimulus
(e.g., the mood or new knowledge about the stimulus) modify
perception of the synesthetic concurrent.
This relationship between perception and conception is an
integral part of the practopoietic theory and specifically, of the
presumed mechanisms of anapoiesis responsible for extraction of
knowledge from long-term to working memory (Nikolic´, 2014).
In this system, the process of perception and the process of
conceptualization of the stimulus rely on the same underlying
mechanisms. That is, there is little difference between perceiving
a situation or an object (e.g., a chair) and conceptualizing that
object, including the most general aspects such as the means of
interacting with that object (e.g., knowing what movements are
needed in order to sit on a given chair).
Also, our proposal, that semantic mechanisms may be respon-
sible for generating some forms of synesthesia (i.e., an ideasthesia)
is compatible with cognitive penetrability of perception, a recent
interdisciplinary approach based on the presumption that there
are various ways in which conscious perception can be modi-
fied by cognition–i.e., by thoughts, beliefs, desires, judgments,
intentions, moods, emotions, expectations, knowledge, previous
experiences and memories (Frith and Dolan, 1997; Bar, 2003;
Raftopoulos, 2005, 2009; Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007; Stokes,
2012; Wu, 2013; Vetter and Newen, 2014). In other words, con-
ceptual contents of higher cognitive states not only have causal
influence on the contents of perception, but they are explanatorily
relevant when trying to account for the processing of perceptual
systems. Similarly relevant are the semantic aspects of inducers
for explaining the induction of concurrents in synesthesia. A
full understanding of how the mind works requires considering
the tight relations holding among the cognitive and perceptual
domains and their mutual impact.
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